The article aims to think anew about the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Court, based in Arusha, enjoys a distinctive contentious jurisdiction which extends to the interpretation and application of any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned. The Court's striking features set it apart from human rights bodies and most international courts. Its jurisdiction has been received with scepticism and fear arguing that, if the Court extends its jurisdiction over treaties other than the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, this will lead to jurisprudential chaos and will undermine the formation of the African corpus juris. This article discusses the case law of the Court since 2013, when the Court started functioning, and argues that these concerns are over-emphasized. The analysis underlines the shifting authority of specialized and/or regional courts; the need not to overstress but to appreciate positively instances of divergence; and the consideration of new conceptual and geographical topoi, in which international law is to be found and produced.
INTRODUCTION
In this article I discuss anew ideas about the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights ('the Court' or ACtHPR). The Court, based in Arusha, enjoys a distinctive contentious jurisdiction. Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights ('Protocol to the ACHPR') reads:
The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned. 1 Article 7 of the Protocol to the ACHPR (sources of law) reads in identical terms. 2 The distinctiveness of the ACtHPR's jurisdiction lies in the fact that its mandate extends to the interpretation and application of any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned. In contrast, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) is limited to matters concerning the interpretation and application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 3 and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), 4 respectively. Equally narrow is the competence of the United Nations (UN) human rights bodies each of which has been entrusted with monitoring a given treaty. Consequently, the ACtHPR deviates from the 'prototype' of the jurisdiction of a human rights court/body. Its striking features set it apart also from most international courts, 5 arguably qualifying it as a new 'judicial animal' that introduces a variance in 'judicial genome mapping' . 6 The ACtHPR's jurisdiction to apply, find a violation of and monitor any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned has been received with scepticism and fear. International law scholars, especially (African) scholars writing extensively over the years on the African system on human rights, treat Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the ACHPR as a problematic occurrence, a flaw in the design, or even a mistake in the drafting process. 7 They argue that if the Court extends its jurisdiction over treaties other than the African Charter on Human and People's Rights ('the Charter' or ACHPR), 8 this will lead to jurisprudential chaos 9 and will undermine the formation of the African corpus juris. 10 However, the ACtHPR has proved itself willing to exercise its material jurisdiction to the fullest possible extent. It regularly examines and pronounces on breaches of UN, regional and sub-regional treaties on human rights, and orders States to comply with their obligations under those treaties. Curiously, not much has been written since 2013, when the Court started functioning and delineating the contours of its jurisdiction. 11 In this article I discuss the case law of the Court since 2013 and the ways in which it has construed its jurisdiction. The case law of the Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice (ECCJ), which also applies other human rights treaties (see Sections 3B(ii) and 3C(ii) below), is also brought into specific parts of the discussion for the purpose of further illuminating the ACtHPR's practice. Contrary to mainstream scholarship, I submit that the ACtHPR's different treaty design forms new opportunities and introduces a welcome difference in judicial dispute settlement. A large part of the criticism and scepticism towards the Court's broad jurisdiction has inherited a tradition of exaggerated and counterproductive anxiety regarding where the limitations of a specialized and/or regional court lie-even when, as is the case of the ACtHPR, the court is explicitly authorized to interpret and apply other treaties. This anxiety is connected to the limitations of the jurisdiction of regional and/or specialized international courts (on human rights) and the (alleged) ensuing risks of interpreting and developing international law.
It should be noted that the ACtHPR forms part of a series of developments in the judicial settlement of international disputes. Although the multiplication of international courts has taken place to a great extent on the basis of 'templates' used to design other courts, 12 novelties have found their way onto this legal landscape. Such novelties include the emergence of blended models of adjudication; 13 the creation of courts melding economic and human rights matters into a single jurisdiction; 14 and the establishment of international courts on human rights, which are entrusted to 11 exercise their jurisdiction over more than one human rights treaty. 15 It is puzzling to account for the emergence of these new institutions within the context of the existing categories of dispute settlement. 16 The question, therefore, is whether we are to discuss and assess novel institutions against only the criteria and experience of existing bodies, or shall we also account for and appreciate the foregoing bodies in new light. The present discussion should also be read in light of the question of whether we duly value difference and particularity, in times of emphasizing convergence and harmonization across human rights treaties and the jurisprudence of international courts and bodies. 17 The following analysis is structured in three parts. The second part elucidates the meaning of the qualifications attached to the ACtHPR's jurisdiction as per Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the ACHPR. The meaning of a 'human rights treaty' presents itself with some surprising difficulties. The construction of the Court's jurisdiction needs to be cautiously grounded in the text of its constitutive instruments while, concurrently, limitations on the ACtHPR's jurisdiction cannot be presumed to exist, given the Court's obligation to fulfill its mandate. The third part of this analysis critically assesses the arguments that the Court's broad jurisdiction leads to 'jurisprudential chaos' . This vague claim is tied to three concrete legal issues: first, the anxiety of forum shopping; second, the anxiety that the ACtHPR-a regional and specialized international courtmonitors other human rights treaties; and, third, the anxiety of undermining African human rights law, by either risking its specificity or by fragmenting it. I argue that these concerns are over-emphasized. The discussion underlines the shifting authority of specialized and/or regional courts; the need not to overstress but to appreciate positively instances of divergence; and the consideration of new conceptual and geographical topoi, in which international law is to be found and produced.
Still, some of the legal issues raised regarding the ACtHPR's wide jurisdiction contain merit. Interestingly, the case law of the ACtHPR suggests that it may be developing a policy of judicial self-restraint by not examining all of the claims submitted by applicants regarding violations of other human rights treaties. Procedural economy, the Court's competence in shaping the subject of a dispute and the possibility of making a choice of applicable law are distinct bases upon which propriety considerations could be introduced to the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction. Finally, the risk of undermining the specificity of African human rights law is a valid concern but it is shown that this risk is more likely to materialize not as a result of the ACtHPR's broad jurisdiction, but in the context of the interpretation process. The article concludes by underlining that we cannot conceptualize the new and novel according to the standards of the old and prevalent. It is not only that we need to think anew about a different international court-the ACtHPR. Conversely, the ACtHPR is also an invitation to rethink how we approach both old and new international courts and to pave new ways forward in international judicial settlement. 18
CLARIFYING THE AFRICAN COURT OF HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS' JURISDICTION TO INTERPRET AND APPLY OTHER
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES The preparatory work of the Protocol to the ACHPR does not give any indication of why the Court was entrusted with such a broad mandate to interpret and apply other human rights treaties. 19 Given the lengthy negotiations over the creation of the Court dating back to the 1960s, 20 it is unlikely that Article 3 of the Protocol to the ACHPR was a mistake in the drafting stage. 21 This conclusion is also supported by the equally wide jurisdiction accorded to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which will merge in the future with the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. 22 The drafters, perhaps, thought that the requirement to make a separate optional declaration accepting the Court's competence (under Article 34(6) of the Protocol to the ACHPR) balanced out the Court's unusually broad jurisdiction. Thirty out of 54 African States have ratified the Protocol to the ACHPR, 23 and nine thus far (Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Tunisia and The Gambia) have consented to the Court's competence to receive complaints from individuals and nongovernmental organizations. 24 This section argues that the text of Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the ACHPR leaves little room to question the Court's material jurisdiction to decide complaints regarding an alleged violation of a human rights treaty in Africa (regional or sub-regional) or at the UN level. 25 Various arguments have been put forward to limit the Court's mandate to hear such complaints, but a restrictive construction of the Court's jurisdiction ratione materie cannot be presumed, since this would prevent the Court from discharging its role.
A. The Meaning of a 'Human Rights Instrument Ratified by the States Concerned' Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the ACHPR clearly stipulates that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction over any other relevant human rights instrument insofar as it is ratified by the State(s) concerned. Applicants have brought complaints regarding alleged violations of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, even though the UDHR is not a treaty. 26 The Court has treated such complaints inconsistently. Although the Court in Tanganyika Law Society did not rule out the possibility of examining such complaints, 27 it subsequently maintained that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain a claim concerning an alleged breach of the UDHR, although the UDHR can be used as a source of inspiration for interpreting the Charter. 28 However, in 2018 the Court found that the deprivation of the applicant's nationality was contrary to Article 15(2) of the UDHR, and it declared a violation in the operative provisions of its judgment. 29
B. The Meaning of the Qualifications 'States Concerned' and 'Relevant'
An argument raised with regard to limiting the material jurisdiction of the Court concerns the construction of the qualification 'instrument ratified by the States concerned' (emphasis added) as referring to instruments ratified by all parties to the Protocol to the ACHPR, and not only by the respondent State before the Court. 30 This idea cannot be supported by reference to the Court's constitutive instruments. A careful reading of the Protocol demonstrates that the expressions 'State(s) concerned' 31 and 'States parties to the Protocol' 32 are employed in different ways-even within the context of a single provision (for example, Article 25). If Article 3(1) had meant to set the requirement that all State parties to the Protocol need to have ratified a human rights treaty, this would have been stated explicitly.
It has also been suggested that the term 'relevant' concerns only treaties that explicitly provide in their text that they are subject to the Court's jurisdiction. 33 This suggestion, however, is refuted by the fact that neither the African Charter nor the Protocol point in this direction; additionally, the ordinary meaning of the term 'relevant' refers to 26 the subject matter of the complaint brought before the Court and the human rights involved therein. 34 This, of course, does not answer the question of how one is to determine which human rights treaties are relevant. Although the meaning of the term 'relevant' appears to be uncomplicated, this is misleading. 35 For purposes of the present discussion, it suffices to underline that it can be a burdensome task for the Court to research systematically all possible relevant human rights treaties in every single case. The applicants' claims and submissions can be useful in this regard.
C. Back to the Basics: What is a Human Rights Treaty (within the Meaning of Article 3 Protocol to the ACHPR)?
Certain qualifications attached to the Court's contentious jurisdiction under Article 3 of the Protocol to the ACHPR may appear straightforward, but they are surprisingly challenging. This is the case with the expression 'human rights treaty' . The Court had the opportunity early on in its case law to interpret and apply treaties whose human rights classification was in dispute. In Tanganyika Law Society, the respondent State, Tanzania, argued that the 1993 Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States 36 is not a human rights treaty within the meaning of Article 3 of the Protocol and, therefore, it did not fall in the Court's jurisdiction. The Court's judgment did not address Tanzania's objection. However, the former Vice-President of the Court, Fatsah Ouguergouz, devoted the greater part of his Separate Opinion to this issue. 37 The main thrust of the Vice-President's position was that the Court should have drawn a distinction between treaties which mainly dealt with the protection of human rights and treaties which addressed other matters but contained provisions relating to human rights. Treaties of the latter category placed obligations on State parties without necessarily according subjective rights to individuals. 38 The Court scrutinized the matter of the meaning of a 'human rights treaty' in Actions pour la protection de droits de l'homme. 39 of these treaties. Such purposes 'are reflected either by an express enunciation of the subjective rights of individuals or by mandatory obligations on State parties for the consequent enjoyment of the said rights.' 43 The conclusion was that these treaties qualified as human rights treaties because the State parties' obligation to establish independent and impartial electoral bodies is aimed at implementing the human rights provided under the ACHPR. 44 This reasoning is tenuous, and prompts the following observations. First, it is not clear from Actions pour la Protection de Droits de l'Homme how the Court inferred that States' obligations under these two treaties are aimed at implementing rights guaranteed in the ACHPR. The ECOWAS Democracy Protocol furnishes no obvious link with human rights, either in the preamble or in its main text. The African Charter on Democracy does contain certain references to the promotion of human rights in connection with good governance and democracy, although these references are vague. 45 Moreover, even though States parties to the African Charter on Democracy have undertaken the obligations to implement it in accordance with respect for human rights and democratic principles (Article 3(1)) and to ensure that citizens enjoy human rights (Article 6), there is no specific mention of the ACHPR or human rights, such as the right to political participation. There is little, if any, evidence to substantiate the ACtHPR's position that the obligation incumbent on State parties to the African Charter on Democracy to establish independent and impartial electoral bodies is aimed at implementing human rights under the ACHPR. The commitment of the State parties to the African Charter on Democracy to hold regular, transparent, free and fair elections (Article 17), and to implementing the said Charter in accordance with the principle of effective participation of citizens in democratic and development processes and in the governance of public affairs (Article 3(7)), are not compelling arguments in themselves either.
Second, even if the Court's conclusion were sound and well reasoned, the fact that a treaty and/or a treaty provision was intended to implement a human right is not, on its own, a determinative criterion for establishing that a given treaty is a human rights treaty. For instance, if a bilateral investment treaty implements aspects of the right to property, does this make it a human rights treaty within the meaning of Article 3 of the Protocol to the ACHPR?
Third, in Actions pour la protection des droits de l'Homme, 46 (Article 3 AP1). Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt concerned the question of whether Article 3 P1 gave rise to individual rights that are automatically conferred on everyone, or gave rise only to obligations between States. 48 Thus, the ECtHR in Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt and the ACtHPR in Actions pour la protection de droits de l'homme may have reached the same conclusion, but the text of the treaties concerned and the Courts' reasoning differ substantially. In contrast to the ACtHPR's reasoning, the ECtHR showed clear evidence confirming that Article 3 P1 confers rights on individuals. 49 Since the ACtHPR has not elucidated questions which go directly to the core of its material jurisdiction in a satisfactory fashion, the meaning of 'human rights treaty' in the context of Article 3 of the Protocol merits further discussion. The analysis below highlights criteria that are more concrete by drawing a distinction between treaties whose main purpose is the protection of human rights and treaties that contain provisions relating to human rights although this is not their main purpose.
(i) A treaty whose main purpose is the protection of human rights
A valid starting point for a discussion of the meaning of 'human rights treaty' under Article 3 of the Protocol to the ACHPR is to examine the object and purpose of a given treaty. A treaty may have more than one object and purpose. 50 The purpose of a treaty refers to its raison d'être-the reason(s) it was created in the first place-whereas the object of a treaty refers to the reciprocal exchange of rights and obligations among parties to the treaty. 51 If the protection of human rights is a treaty's main purpose (or one of its main purposes), the treaty falls under the ACtHPR's jurisdiction ratione materiae (subject, of course, to the other qualifications set out in Article 3 of the Protocol to the ACHPR).
(ii) The object of a treaty: A treaty whose main purpose is not the protection of human rights but contains provisions relating to human rights
The next question is whether a treaty can be regarded as a human rights treaty for the purposes of Article 3 of the Protocol to the ACHPR even if its main purpose is not the protection of human rights. 52 The ACtHPR, in Actions pour la Protection de Droits de l'Homme, stated that if a treaty provision expressly confers subjective rights on individuals, or if such rights derive from obligations incumbent on States, then this treaty falls under its jurisdiction. The IACtHR's approach lends further support to the position. The IACtHR, in the Advisory Opinion 'Other Treaties' Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, was asked to clarify its advisory function with 48 Ibid. at para 48. 49 Ibid. at para 49. Article 5 P1 provides that the provisions of its Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall be regarded as additional Articles to the ECHR. The ECtHR also highlighted that Article 3 P1 is of great importance to fulfilling the aim of the ECHR as reflected in the Preamble, according to which fundamental human rights are best maintained by an effective political democracy: see ibid. at para 47. 50 Villiger, supra n 34 at 427. regard to interpreting 'other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states' . 53 It opined that a treaty is subject to its advisory jurisdiction as long as it contains provisions concerning human rights, even if the protection of human rights is not one of that treaty's main purposes. 54 Nonetheless, the pronouncements of the IACtHR should be appreciated with the caveat that the IACtHR endowed itself with a wide jurisdiction in the exercise of its advisory function. 55 One should therefore be cautious about 'transplanting' the ACtHPR's reasoning adopted in the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction when discussing its contentious jurisdiction. 56 Turning now to the precise criteria for determining when such a treaty can be regarded as a human rights treaty, certain scholars have asserted that even when a treaty is not a human rights treaty, it may still have a human rights dimension or human rights implications. 57 Similarly, the IACtHR held that it is empowered to invoke any treaty insofar as it has a bearing upon, affects or is of interest to the protection of human rights. 58 According to Article 4(1) Protocol to the ACHPR 'the Court may provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments' . However, the Court in two different orders relating to separate requests for an advisory opinion on the same legal questions adopted a very restrictive construction of its advisory function: see ACtHPR of a potentially unlimited number of treaties. Consequently, the foregoing considerations are not particularly helpful, since they establish only a tenuous connection with the concept of a human rights treaty. One way forward is to focus on the object of the treaty by relying on specific treaty provisions, rather than on a treaty's human rights implications in the abstract. 59 The matter is straightforward when a treaty contains provisions which confer direct entitlements and claims on individuals. However, this does not necessarily mean that these individual rights also qualify as human rights. A relevant example is the interpretation of Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), 60 which concerns the privileges relating to a consular post and, in particular, issues of communication and contact with nationals of the sending State who are in prison, custody or detention. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the LaGrand case, 61 having found that Article 36 of the VCCR confers rights on individuals, concluded that those rights are not human rights. The ICJ reaffirmed in an obiter dictum in the Avena case 62 that neither the text, nor the object and purpose of the VCCR, nor any indication in the travaux préparatoires supported the argument that the VCCR confers human rights on individuals. Interestingly, the IACtHR, in The Right to Information Advisory Opinion, found that the rights contained in Article 36 of the VCCR are human rights. 63 Therefore, there are instances in which it is not clear whether individual rights are human rights.
It can be equally difficult to assess whether or not a treaty that imposes specific obligations on State parties confers specific rights and claims on individuals. Even if the fulfilment of these obligations leads to the enjoyment of specific rights and individuals benefit from the application of a treaty, 64 it does not always follow that individuals derive these rights. States may undertake to comply with treaty obligations in relation to individuals without conferring direct entitlements on them. 65 This is a matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis by ascertaining the object of the treaty and interpreting the exchange of rights and obligations among State parties. A relevant example is whether the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 66 confers rights on individuals and, consequently, whether it can be considered a human rights instrument according to Article 3 of the Protocol to ACHPR. It has been argued 59 that although provisions of the AU Convention on Corruption are framed mostly as obligations placed on States, these obligations correspond to rights that can be claimed by individuals. 67 At first glance, the protection of human rights does not appear to be one of the main purposes of the AU Convention on Corruption. The preamble contains references to 'removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights' (eleventh paragraph), and the explicit reference to respect for human rights and the Charter (fourth paragraph). Nonetheless these references are very vague, and more importantly they do not establish the promotion of human rights as one of the purposes of the AU Convention on Corruption. It is rather the promotion of socio-economic development, which, in turn, is supported by the removal of obstacles to the enjoyment of human rights. 68 Still, there are indications that the object of the treaty furnishes a link to human rights. Pursuant to Article 3(2), State parties to the AU Convention on Corruption undertake to respect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the ACHPR and other relevant human rights instruments. More specifically, Articles 13(3) and 14 provide the right to a fair trial, and Article 12(4) provides aspects of the right to freedom of expression. However, with the exception of these two rights one cannot make a convincing argument for inferring, in general, individual rights from State obligations enshrined in the AU Convention on Corruption.
To conclude, Article 3(1) of the Protocol to the ACHPR does not leave much room to question the Court's jurisdiction to decide complaints concerning other human rights treaties. Despite the arguments that have been put forward in international law scholarship, one cannot presume a restrictive construction of the Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae. A more systematic and rigorous examination of the meaning of 'human rights treaty' is expected of the Court, especially since this is a prerequisite to exercise its material jurisdiction. When a treaty does not have the protection of human rights as one of its main purposes, a vague discussion concerning the human rights implications or dimension of that treaty is not informative in practice. The focus should rather be placed on the object of the treaty and specific treaty provision(s) in order to examine, first, whether a treaty provision that imposes specific obligations on States confers specific rights on individuals and, second, whether such individual rights qualify as human rights.
THE ANXIETY OF 'JURISPRUDENTIAL CHAOS'
Despite strong concerns encouraging the Court to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction over human rights treaties ratified by African States 69 or to tailor its mandate to the narrow scope of the jurisdiction of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights ('the Commission' or AComHPR) examining only alleged violations 67 Viljoen, supra n 7 at 436. 68 According to Article 2(4), one of the objectives of the Convention is to 'promote socio-economic development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights.' 69 For example, Heyns, supra n 7 at 168. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/hrlr/article-abstract/19/2/255/5536883 by guest on 05 August 2019 of the ACHPR, 70 the ACtHPR has proceeded to fully explore the scope of its material jurisdiction. Having discussed the meaning of the qualifications attached to the Court's jurisdiction, this section addresses scholars' fears, namely that allowing complaints of violations of a variety of human rights treaties to be brought before the Court will lead to 'jurisprudential chaos' . 71 Jurisprudential chaos is a vague claim. The analysis in this section ties this claim to three concrete legal issues underpinning the debate: first, the anxiety of forum shopping in light of the multiplicity of international courts; second, the anxiety of the ACtHPR monitoring other human rights treaties; and third, the anxiety of threatening African human rights law. The analysis finds that the jurisprudential chaos claim generally reflects an anxiety associated with repeatedly exaggerated concerns regarding the limits of the jurisdiction of regional and/or specialized international courts, and the ensuing risks to interpreting and developing international law. However, some of the concerns raised merit further discussion. 72 The case law of the Court suggests that it may be developing a policy of judicial self-restraint by not examining all of the submissions of the applicants regarding violations of other human rights treaties. The case law of the ECCJ is also brought into specific aspects of the discussion below, in order to shed some light on the ACtHPR's practice.
A. The Anxiety of Forum Shopping
The subject matter jurisdiction of the ACtHPR allows applicants to submit complaints regarding alleged violations of other human rights treaties in any of the following (nonexhaustive) scenarios: a) An applicant may bring a case claiming a violation of a right which is not protected under the ACHPR but is envisaged by another treaty ratified by the State concerned, such as the right to housing under Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 73 b) An applicant may rely on and allege a breach of a right which, although envisaged in the ACHPR, is formulated in another treaty in a manner that ensures a higher level of protection. This may be due to a broader protective scope of this right, or a more restricted limitation attached thereto. 74 Lohé Issa Konaté 75 is a case in point. c) An applicant may claim a violation of a human right which is protected in the same way under both the ACHPR and another treaty, but no mechanism is envisaged or is available to the applicant under that other treaty. For example, many cases have already been brought against Tanzania with regard to violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 76 since Tanzania has not ratified the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 77 d) Finally, an applicant may choose to bring a complaint before the ACtHPR (instead of or in addition to another international body) as part of a litigation strategy (for example, considerations of physical proximity to a forum and litigation costs). 78
The Court's case law demonstrates that applicants are familiar with the claims and arguments that they can raise in connection with other human rights treaties. The Court has examined alleged violations of a series of treaties, including the ICCPR, 79 the ICESCR, 80 Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa ('Maputo Protocol') 85 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 86 There are instances in which applicants have submitted violations of other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned without invoking a violation of the Charter. In the Frank David Omary and Alex Thomas cases, the applicants argued a violation of the UDHR without mentioning any right under the Charter. The Court clarified that although it had no jurisdiction over the UDHR, it did have jurisdiction to decide complaints concerning either the Charter or other relevant human rights treaties (or both). 87 On other occasions, the applicants submitted their complaints without referring to specific treaties. Tanzania, in the Wilfred Onyango Nganyi and Kennedy Owino Onyachi cases, 88 raised preliminary objections ratione materiae arguing that the applicants had not invoked any human rights treaties. The Court maintained that the factual basis of the alleged violations was sufficient to ascertain whether the complaints fall within the scope of specific rights under the Charter or other human rights treaties. 89 In Kennedy Owino Onyachi, the Court found, on its own initiative, that the applicants' submissions contained alleged violations of the Charter and the ICCPR (even though the Court did not proceed to discuss the ICCPR on the merits). 90 This is a sound approach, since questions pertaining to the jurisdiction ratione materiae of international courts are examined proprio motu. 91 92 the Court examined and decided alleged violations of other treaties on human rights without bringing the ACHPR into play. It is the first case in which the Court decided a complaint strictly on the basis of other treaties on human rights without implicating the Charter.
It becomes clear that the ACtHPR can be-and, indeed, is-used as a forum for bringing complaints regarding other human rights treaties. The argument against this practice is that the existence and use of multiple venues for adjudicating international (human rights) claims may lead courts to favour approaches to tailor their 'clientele' , and may increase the risk of conflicting judgments. 93 Forum shopping has acquired a negative connotation, even though it is at least equally arguable that the term 'forum shopping' is misleading and it does not belong to the lexicon of international law due to the latter's decentralized nature. 94 Choice of forum is the inevitable consequence of the specialization and deepening of international law coupled with the multiplicity of international courts and other bodies. The multiplicity of international courts embodies the complexity of relations between States (and other actors). 95 Increasing third-party settlement of international disputes through law-based forums makes (human rights-related) disputes justiciable, and paves the way for authoritative pronouncements of international law. The risk of diverging interpretations of the law is largely exaggerated. 96 Choice of forum enables creativity through dialogue among courts. 97 The possibility of multiple international courts being able to hear a dispute (or aspects thereof) not only proves beneficial to the individuals concerned, but also entails a healthy level of competition among courts, thereby improving the quality of their rulings and encouraging them to keep an eye on one another. 98 It is frequently argued that States could take advantage of differing views of international courts and bodies on human rights by acknowledging the milder view, and the lowest common denominator in human rights protection. 99 Yet, there is no State practice or precedent to support this claim. 100 There is little evidence regulating the phenomenon of bringing multiple claims over the same or a similar matter, successively or simultaneously, before different bodies. 101 In the absence of explicit regulation of choice of forum by States (for example, by inserting a specific treaty clause), States and individuals may exercise all options available to them, including choice of forum, simultaneous petitioning and successive petitioning. 102 The ACHPR is interpreted as allowing all these options, with the exception of cases that have been settled by the States involved (Article 56(7) ACHPR). 103 This suggests that the admissibility criterion requires not only the finality of the settlement, but also settlement on an inter-State level (thereby excluding claims by individuals against the State). 104 Moreover, successive petitioning concerning claims under the ICCPR is permitted; it is allowed if the Human Rights Committee (HRC) is satisfied that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure concurrently. 105
B. The Anxiety of Monitoring Other Human Rights Treaties
The ACtHPR systematically applies, and finds violations of, other human rights treaties, including regional, sub-regional and global. It also monitors their implementation, and orders the respondent States to comply with their respective obligations. Some examples from the case law are the following. In Lohé Issa Konaté, the Court found that Burkina Faso's Penal Code (prescribing custodial and non-custodial sentences for defamation), as well as the sentencing of the applicant to imprisonment and excessive fines, were contrary not only to the requirements of Article 9 of the Charter but also to Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 66(2)(c) ECOWAS Revised Treaty concerning the rights of journalists. 106 In another 2017 freedom of expression case, Rwanda was held in violation of both Article 9(2) of the Charter and Article 19 of the ICCPR. 107 In Actions pour la protection des droits de l'homme, the Court proclaimed that Côte d'Ivoire violated its obligations both to establish impartial and independent electoral bodies and to provide equal protection under the law, as enshrined in Article 3 of the ACHPR, Articles 10(3) and 17 of the African Charter on Democracy, Article 3 of ECOWAS Democracy Protocol and Article 26 of the ICCPR. 108 Côte d'Ivoire was ordered to bring its domestic law in compliance with the requirements of these treaties. In Anudo Ochieng Anudo, Tanzania was found to have arbitrarily expelled the applicant in violation of Article 7 of the Charter and Article 14 of the ICCPR. 109 cluster of cases, Tanzania's systematic failure to protect various aspects of the right to a fair trial led to a violation of Article 7 of the ACHPR and Article 14 of the ICCPR. 110 In 2018, the domestic legislation of the Republic of Mali was found to be inconsistent with the State's obligations under CEDAW, 111 the Maputo Protocol 112 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 113 The Court ordered the Republic of Mali to amend its domestic law in conformity with the standards set by the foregoing treaties.
It is worthwhile to note that the ECCJ, in tune with the ACtHPR, construes its material jurisdiction to include alleged violations of the UDHR 114 and UN human rights treaties to which ECOWAS Member States are parties, 115 such as the ICCPR, 116 the ICESCR, 117 the Convention Against Torture (CAT) 118 and CEDAW. 119 The SERAP case is the only instance in which a State challenged the ECCJ's jurisdiction ratione materiae. 120 Nigeria argued that the ECCJ did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on alleged violations of the ICCPR and ICESCR because, first, the Nigerian Constitution recognizes only the jurisdiction of Nigerian courts over the ICCPR and, second, the ICESCR is not justiciable. The ECCJ dismissed the objection by stating that [B]y establishing the jurisdiction of the Court, [the Member States parties to the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS] have created a mechanism for guaranteeing and protecting human rights within the framework of ECOWAS so as to implement the human rights contained in all the international instruments they are signatory to. 121 The prospect of UN human rights treaties being justiciable and enforceable by a regional human rights court is a source of uneasiness, to say the least. Entrusting such a task to a regional human rights court is 'highly unusual' . 122 Yet, the ACtHPR has clear jurisdiction to apply and monitor UN human rights treaties (if ratified by the State concerned). From a strictly legal point of view, the question of whether a given African State has also consented to the individual communications procedure under a UN human rights treaty is immaterial. 123 The same can be said for the ECCJ, which has also been subject to criticism for exercising its jurisdiction over UN treaties. 124 The ACtHPR's jurisdiction ratione materiae deviates from the 'prototype' of the contentious jurisdiction of international courts on human rights, which is typically limited to the interpretation and application of a specific regional treaty. For this reason, the ACtHPR does not sit well within the existing categories of adjudicative bodies 125 and, consequently, the relevance of arguments concerning other international courts should not be taken for granted when addressing the ACtHPR. The following discussion engages with the question of whether concerns raised with regard to the jurisdiction of the ACtHPR have certain merit or merely project anxieties from dissimilar contexts and, if yes, to what extent.
(i) Towards an Arusha-based world court on human rights for African States?
One may argue that, as far as African States are concerned, the ACtHPR functions as a world court on human rights based in Arusha. 126 Ideas about consolidating human rights monitoring mechanisms into a single judicial body-a World Court on Human Rights-have been debated for decades. 127 Clearly the design of the ACtHPR is not what was expected by many, but it is an intriguing design in international judicial adjudication. It obligations of State parties under the auspices of a single judicial body on a regional level. The ACtHPR is 'the judicial arm of the panoply of human rights agreements concluded under the aegis of the United Nations' . 128 Notably this model is expected to be strengthened, since the future African Court of Justice and Human Rights is entrusted 129 not only with all legal disputes concerning the interpretation and the application of the Charter and any other legal instruments relating to human rights ratified by the States parties concerned, but also with legal disputes concerning any question of international law. 130 In this context, three main reasons may be discerned for treating the broad jurisdiction of the ACtHPR as a problem, rather than a welcome variance, in dispute settlement.
The first reason for being distrustful toward the ACtHPR's jurisdiction lies in the authority of a regional court to apply, declare violations of and monitor UN treaties. 131 The function of an international court on a regional level or a given geographical area casts doubt onto its relevance at a global level. 132 An early and characteristic case in point was the Central American Court of Justice. In 1944, Manley Hudson strongly opposed the creation of a regional international court of general jurisdiction, because it would allegedly give rise to 'a particularistic development of international law' , 133 and it would risk the primacy and universality of general international law. 134 This mindset is also reflected in the way that scholars and practitioners systematize international courts, dividing them on the basis of their regional and universal jurisdiction, respectively. 135 However, not everybody currently sees these developments in a negative light. 136 will be discussed below, regional and specialized developments, as well as pronouncements of all international courts, inform (general) international law. 137 This strongly suggests the need for a more nuanced approach regarding the value and relevance of judgments and pronouncements by regional international courts. A second reason for treating the ACtHPR's jurisdiction as a problematic circumstance rests upon the prevailing view that specialized international courts create risks for diverging interpretations of international law. For this reason, specialized international courts should not extend their pronouncements beyond matters which 'do not lie within the specific purview of [their] jurisdiction' . 138 In the context of the present discussion, this entails that the ACtHPR should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction over other treaties on human rights. 139 This line of thinking reflects the insistence on underlining the alleged risks posed by international courts entrusted with interpreting, applying and monitoring a specific treaty and/or subject area, because they 'could lead to the destruction of the very foundation of international law' . 140 The main concern is that different interpretations of similar or identical rules of international law can undermine the integrity of general international law, and the overall consistency of international law. This anxiety is all the more pronounced with respect to international courts on human rights, which are typically regional and specialized in scope. 141 Lex regionis and lex specialis have been formulated and developed as conjoined twins, and have defined the identity of (and role served by) human rights courts. Nonetheless, this view disregards first that the concept of divergence is over-emphasized and, second, that the distinction between courts of general jurisdiction and courts entrusted with specialized and/or regional jurisdiction is elusive, if not artificial. 142 As to the first point on over-emphasizing divergence, it regularly gets overlooked that different interpretations and even divergences qualify as natural and welcome consequences of the nature and function of international law. The starting point of this discussion should be that two international courts disagreeing over the content of rules of international law is a healthy phenomenon. 143 In fact, given the nature of international law, and in the absence of explicit regulation by States, 'there can be as many judicial interpretations as there are [international] courts' . 144 Moreover, looking for and highlighting a handful of instances of divergences and/or disagreements 145 over-stresses the phenomenon and distorts the overall picture of communication and coordination among international courts. 146 It is also crucial how one appreciates divergence. There is a thin line separating divergence from the development of international law (or the potential to develop international law). 147 The Loizidou and Tadić cases are the most well-cited examples of giving rise to wrong and impermissible divergences to (general) international law. 148 However, in retrospect, Loizidou 149 is not treated anymore as a divergence to the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, 150 but as having paved the way for the enrichment of international law. 151 The Tadić case is treated by many as hardly a drama, 152 given the different relevant contexts of the jurisdictions of and cases before the ICJ and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia respectively.
Returning to the second point on the implications of distinguishing between courts of general jurisdiction and courts entrusted with specialized and/or regional jurisdiction, there is a growing acceptance of the role and value of regional and/or specialized courts and other bodies. The main frame of reference of this line of thinking is that international courts have much to learn from each other 153 and that each international court, in one way or another, applies the law whose content has been influenced by other international courts as well as other bodies. 154 The ICJ, in a departure from its long-standing practice, now openly acknowledges and appreciates the authority of regional and special international courts. 155 The ICJ affirmed their contribution to ascertaining the formation and content of customary international law, 156 to discerning general principles 157 and to interpreting international treaties. In 2010, within the context of interpreting the ICCPR, the ICJ stated that '[a]lthough the Court is in no way obliged, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to model its own interpretation of the Covenant on that of the Committee, it believes that it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this independent body that was established specifically to supervise the application of that treaty' . 158 The Court used the views of the CAT Committee to interpret the CAT, 159 the views of the HRC's to interpret the ICCPR, 160 and the views of the ACmHPR to interpret the ACHPR. 161 Interestingly, in order to confirm its construction of the ACHPR, the Court gave due regard to the case law of both the ECtHR and IACtHR. 162 The foregoing points demonstrate that the possibility of different interpretations of UN and other treaties by the ACtHPR or the alleged risk to the coherence of international (human rights) law 163 should not be overemphasized. Such concerns can be mitigated as much as possible by way of interpretation and cross-judicial dialogue. 164 In line with this, the ACtHPR gives refers extensively to the views of UN bodies 165 and the jurisprudence of other human rights courts. 166 The ECCJ also follows the same approach. 167 Interestingly, a characteristic example of the ACtHPR unjustifiably refraining from addressing issues of general international law is its orders relating to two separate requests for an advisory opinion on the same legal questions pertaining to the case of Al Bashir. 168 In particular, the questions asked by the authors of the requests concerned the relationship of an African State's obligations under the Rome Statute (obligation to cooperate with the International Criminal Court) and as AU Members (obligation to comply with an AU resolution calling for non-cooperation of its members with the International Criminal Court). 169 The Court rejected the requests because, among other reasons, 'the issues raised by the authors are rather of general public international law and not human rights. Indeed, the issues raised have to do with the hierarchy of norms in public international law' . 170 The Court's dubious reasoning, however, does not explain why these issues do not relate to a 'legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments' (Article 4(1) Protocol to the ACHPR) thereby falling under its jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion. What is all the more important for the present discussion is the artificial and unsound distinction that the Court drew between the so-called general international law and human rights as if human rights is an area unrelated to international law. 171 Judge Ouguergouz in his dissenting opinion correctly highlighted that human rights, like any other matter governed by international law, is likely to raise issues relating to the law of treaties, including any issues of hierarchy of international norms. 172 This (and the admittedly highly politicized issues concerning President Al Bashir) is not a reason for the Court to refrain from rendering an advisory opinion should the questions at hand relate indeed to a legal matter concerning the Charter (or any other relevant human rights instruments). 165 On the ACtHPR taking into consideration of General Comments by the HRC and the ICESCR Committee as authoritative statements on the interpretation of the provisions of the respective UN treaties, see Finally, a third reason for being particularly reluctant to entertain the possibility that a regional international court may monitor UN or other global treaties concerns specifically the conceptual and geographical topos of the ACtHPR. The authority of regional bodies to construe international law brings to the fore informal hierarchies among said international courts, and the structural imbalance entrenched in the Euro-centred map of the international law landscape. 173 The fixity of cities and spaces of delivering international justice, and developing international law, is well reflected in the very limited number and geographical worldwide scope of those cities in which these processes take place. 174 The 'law of Geneva' and the 'law of The Hague' assign international law a location, and narrate a specific story of progress. 175 This inhibits us from giving due regard to the seemingly unlikely places in which international law may be found. 176 The ACtHPR can be seen as part of a different plausible map of international law, 177 supporting a plurality of loci for experimenting with, and articulating, variant designs. As far as our perception is concerned, there is a geographical and conceptual distance to bridge between envisaging Geneva as the seat of the proposed World Court on Human Rights on the one hand, 178 and accepting the possibility that Arusha is the seat of the World Court on Human Rights for African States, on the other hand. Bridging this gap challenges us to rethink human rights law and institutions. 179 Murray has perceptively highlighted that international human rights law and international human rights scholars have focused primarily on European and Western sources and neglected other jurisdictions. Western scholars give the impression that one has little to learn from African institutions and their experiences, under the pretexts that the ACtHPR is a young institution, ineffective or irrelevant. 180 One should add to this that it is not only Western scholars, but also African scholars, who do not seem to value the unique features and potential of the ACtHPR; they focus, instead, on the alleged risks posed by the diversion from the mainstream 'model(s) of success' of regional human rights courts as well as, in general, the 'templates' of designing mechanisms of international judicial dispute settlement. 181
(ii) Introducing propriety considerations in exercising the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights' jurisdiction?
Interestingly, the ACtHPR may be developing a policy of judicial restraint when exercising its jurisdiction over human rights treaties other than the ACHPR. The Court proclaimed that it is not necessary to consider alleged violations of the ICCPR if it has already ruled on similar alleged violations under the relevant provisions of the 193, 195 . 181 Alter, Helfer and McAllister, supra n 5 at 779, is a rare example of scholars who embrace the potential of the ongoing 'natural experiment' in judicial dispute settlement in the African continent.
Charter. 182 In this way, the Court seems to prioritize alleged violations under the Charter, but no criteria are articulated on when it is unnecessary to examine those other treaties. In other instances, the Court simply did not address the applicants' claims regarding alleged violations of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, without elaborating on the reasons for not doing so. 183 The Court maintains an inconsistent practice regarding the examination of similar or identical provisions given under different human rights treaties. For example, in the cases of Lohé Issa Konaté and Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza, the Court found that Article 19 of the ICCPR had been breached, whereas in Aboulaye Nikiema and Others the Court deemed the examination of the alleged violation of Article 19 of the ICCPR unnecessary. 184 Another cluster of cases concerning the right to free legal assistance under the right to a fair trial provide further evidence of the discrepant case law. In its 2015 judgment in the Alex Thomas case, the ACtHPR found that Tanzania had failed to comply with its obligations under both the Charter and the ICCPR. 185 The subsequent Wilfred Onyango Nganyi case mentions a violation only of the Charter. 186 Finally, in the 2016 Mohamed Abubakari judgment, the Court framed the question before it as being one of whether the State was compliant with Article 7 of the Charter and Article 14 of the ICCPR, and proceeded to affirm that by failing to provide free legal assistance, Tanzania was in violation of both Article 7 of the Charter and Article 14 of the ICCPR. 187 At the other end of the spectrum, in the recent APDF and The Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Republic of Mali judgment, the Court decided solely on alleged violations of other treaties on human rights without bringing the ACHPR into play. 188 It remains, therefore, to be seen whether this judgment signals a different approach of the Court or an exceptional circumstance. It is notable that the ECCJ also appears to introduce certain caveats to the human rights treaties that it is willing to discuss. In a more rigorously articulated justification compared to the ACtHPR, the ECCJ, in SERAP, stated that when 'various articles of different instruments sanction the same rights, the said instruments may, as far as those specific rights are concerned, be considered equivalent. It suffices therefore to cite the one which affords more effective protection to the right allegedly violated' . 189 The term 'equivalent' denotes norms which are identical or similar, but whose interpretation is subject to the structure, aim, specificities and development of their normative context. 190 Contrary to the ACtHPR, which favours the application of the Charter over other human rights provisions, the ECCJ prefers to apply the more favourable treaty.
The ECCJ's tendency to focus on the more favourable provision may be due to the fact that it does not have a constitutive catalogue of human rights, as the ACtHPR does. That said, since the 2012 SEPAP judgment, the ECCJ has given no indication that it actually applies this statement in practice. In instances in which many treaties were applicable to the facts of a case, the ECCJ found violations of a variety of human rights treaties and instruments (for example, the Charter, the ICCPR, CEDAW or even the UDHR) in a cumulative fashion, without choosing the more favourable and/or equivalent treaty provision.
The inconsistent case law of both Courts does not allow for definite conclusions to be drawn as to whether they actually apply the foregoing caveats to the exercise of their jurisdiction over treaties on human rights. It is possible that the two Courts will create judicial policies introducing propriety considerations, so as not to examine all relevant human rights treaties. It is not uncommon for international courts to limit the scope of a ruling without examining all submissions raised by the applicants or all possible legal bases. Different legal justifications may be furnished to justify such a judicial practice. First, international courts have the power to decide the scope of a claim, by determining how the legal grounds establishing their jurisdiction and the nature of the claims shape the subject of a dispute. 191 A court has the power to ascertain its competence to entertain a legal claim which means that, even though it has jurisdiction to decide a complaint, it may deem it inappropriate to exercise said jurisdiction. 192 Second, international courts may not address all submissions by the applicants or all possible legal bases regarding the complaint(s) due to reasons of procedural economy, or due to their reluctance to address a particular question, 193 as long as a court's approach is not unduly reductive. 194 Third, it is also possible for international courts to make a choice of applicable law in cases in which many rules are applicable. This is not necessarily an issue of lex specialis, but rather an issue of 'locating the corpus of law at the heart of a difficult issue' . 195 An example is the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, in which the ICJ answered the question of the legality of nuclear weapons not by reference to human rights law (right to life under the ICCPR) or principles of environmental law, but by reference to jus in bello. 196 This was not an application of lex specialis, but a question of what norm and/or body of law is the most relevant to the matter as it was submitted to and construed by the ICJ. In light of the distinctive material jurisdiction of the ACtHPR extending over a variety of human rights treaties, one could argue that the ACtHPR may develop a practice of 'calibrating' the dispute and finding the heart of the matter brought before it. 197 The ACtHPR can employ either the procedural economy or the choice of applicable law avenues in order to legally justify, if it deems it necessary, a policy of exercising judicial restraint. In this regard, there is merit in the argument that the ACtHPR exercises its jurisdiction over other human rights treaties only when specific rights are not contained, or are differently formulated, in the ACHPR. 198 More generally, it is not unreasonable either that the Court decides complaints brought before it by prioritizing or choosing as a legal basis of a complaint a right that is provided for in AU treaties. In this way, the Court will find resort to non-AU treaties only when they bring in new rights 199 and, at the same time, it will not lose sight of developing the standards of the ACHPR and the African corpus juris. These suggestions also align with the equivalence idea that the ECCJ put forward in the SEPAP judgment and the ACtHPR's practice to have the ACHPR in the foreground.
In sum, crafting judicial policies which introduce propriety considerations so that the ACtHPR does not examine all relevant human rights treaties presents risks. There is the possibility of unduly reducing the scope of the Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae. Moreover, it is not an easy task to make and justify a choice of a human rights treaty, against which an applicant's complaint shall be assessed. If the ACtHPR proceeds with adopting such a practice, it is strongly advisable that it elaborates on specific criteria as to whether or not a complaint under a human rights treaty should be examined. This is dictated by considerations of legal certainty and equal treatment of the applicants.
A few thoughts need to be devoted to the argument often raised that, if the Court exercises its broad jurisdiction to the fullest possible extent, this will create a political 'backlash' 200 or will deter States from ratifying the Protocol (or even other human rights treaties). 201 These political implications are implicitly framed as an issue for the Court's judicial policy and it is, therefore, fitting to address them in this sub-Section. At this point in time, the practice of State parties to the ACHPR and the Protocol does not support these arguments. No State acting as a respondent State before the Court has ever challenged the Court's construction of its material jurisdiction. If there were a climate of dissatisfaction among States with regard to this matter, it is very likely that they would have raised preliminary objections ratione materiae before the Court. It is only in Tanganyika Law Society that Tanzania challenged the broad interpretation of 'human rights treaty' but not the Court's overall approach to its material jurisdiction. 202 Furthermore, the fact that States parties submit requests for the interpretation of the 197 SERAP, supra n 115 at para 93. Court's previous judgments suggests that States take the Court's remedial orders seriously. 203 More importantly, reducing the issue of States' consenting to and complying with the Court's mandate only to its wide jurisdiction ratione materiae downplays a variety of significant factors which may either deter States from acceding to the ACHPR and the Protocol or give rise to such a 'backlash' . These factors include the broad access to the Court (Article 5 Protocol to the ACHPR), compliance costs, ideological trends, domestic legal traditions and regional and domestic dynamics. 204 One needs to bear in mind that the ACtHPR is called upon to function and develop its case law in a historical context in which not only judicialization of international affairs is being generally slowed down 205 but also there is a general 'backlash' against international law institutions. 206 In light of the foregoing, the present author is of the view that solely the possibility of a political 'backlash' , which is an obviously extra-legal consideration, should not interfere with the Court's mandate and jurisdiction.
C. The Anxiety of Threatening African Human Rights Law

(i) Undermining the specificity of African human rights law
Heyns argues that the broad jurisdiction of the ACtHPR poses a risk to the specificity of the ACHPR because the latter becomes but one treaty among others before the ACtHPR. 207 Although he does not clarify in what way this is a risk, it is likely he means that the Court may be satisfied with finding violations of other treaties at the expense of developing the Charter's standards, and nurturing an African human rights jurisprudence. 208 This is a valid concern. The Court's case law evidences that the Charter is at the core of its legal reasoning, and it systematically discusses alleged violations of the Charter hand in hand with other treaties, as shown in Section 3.2. Nonetheless, this was not the case in the 2018 APDF judgment. In this instance, the Court found Mali in breach of its obligations under CEDAW, the Maputo Protocol and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, without making any effort propio motu to identify relevant provisions of the Charter or to link the Charter with the facts of the case and the applicant's submissions. The Court perhaps preferred to focus on specialized treaties regarding women's and children's rights, but still the Court should have furnished a link with States' obligations under the Charter too. It should be noted that, on this occasion, most of the treaties that the Court discussed (besides CEDAW) are African treaties and, hence, the Court was still developing the African corpus juris.
Creating a 'variable geometry' of State parties' obligations is another point raised regarding the undermining of African human rights by the Court's broad jurisdiction. According to this argument, if the obligations of State parties differ depending on what other human rights treaties a given respondent State has ratified, 209 this may result in a 'variable geometry' of obligations of African States under the Charter and, therefore, inhibit the construction of an African human rights corpus juris. This is not a significant problem (or even a problem in the first place), given that international law in its essence consists of many different variable geometries of international obligations. It is possible for the Court to develop the corpus juris of African human rights while considering and monitoring the implementation of specific treaties, with regard to the specific respondent State(s) in each case.
The risk of undermining the specificity of African human rights law is more likely to materialize not as a result of the ACtHPR's broad jurisdiction, but in the context of the interpretation process. 210 The ACtHPR's systematic reliance on the case law of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights may, in certain instances, raise the question of whether such influence can be disproportionate. Conceptualizing the development of the ACHPR within the context of international human rights law is a challenging task for a young international court. On the one hand, it is expected of the ACtHPR to take into consideration, and benefit from, the long-standing jurisprudence of other regional human rights courts or the views of UN bodies. Articles 60 and 61 of the ACHPR contain concrete guidelines in this regard. 211 On the other hand, coordination and convergence with global and other regional standards should not lead to neglecting the development of a regional (African) human rights' understanding, the contours of which have already been established by the ACmHPR. 212 This specificity is rooted in the unique characteristics of human rights in the design of the ACHPR, including the equal weight accorded to civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights and also peoples' rights, as well as the local (legal) reality in State parties to the ACHPR. Such particularity gives rise to, and justifies, different interpretations of specific human rights (compared to how the same or identical rights are interpreted 209 under other treaties). 213 It is also pertinent to draw a distinction between AU treaties and non-AU human rights treaties. AU treaties (for example, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol) and especially when these AU treaties are protocols to the ACHPR (for example, the Maputo Protocol) should have a privileged position vis-à-vis non-AU treaties in the Court's reasoning with a view to nurturing the Charter in its 'native' environment and to pursue the African corpus juris.
The ways in which the ACtHPR selects and uses relevant international instruments and views of other (non-AU) monitoring bodies and international courts when construing the Charter are crucial. A few concrete examples are called for. When the ACtHPR is in the process of discerning the ordinary meaning of a provision in the ACHPR its starting point and primary focus should be the text of the ACHPR, without resorting prematurely to the case law of the ECtHR regarding the interpretation of an equivalent right under the ECHR. This is what happened in Wilfred Onyango Nganyi, when the ACtHPR, in establishing the meaning of 'trial within a reasonable time' under Article 7(1)(d) of the ACHPR, had recourse to the criteria of reasonableness developed throughout the extensive case law of the ECtHR. 214 Moreover, the ACtHPR should engage in its reasoning with both the global and other regional standards in a balanced and consistent manner-especially if the respondent State is bound by said global standard(s). 215 Otherwise, the ACtHPR runs the risk of 'Europeanizing' or 'Inter-Americanizing' its jurisprudence, 216 in the sense of overemphasizing the relevance and influence of other regional human rights treaties. The criteria set out by the jurisprudence of other international courts need to be tailored and applied in light of local circumstances and legal reality in African countries. In Mohamed Abubakari, the fact that the judgment was not delivered publicly should have arguably been given more weight in the assessment of the alleged violation of the right to a fair trial under the ACHPR since, unlike in Europe, it is not common practice in many African States to have immediate access to the text of the judgment. 217 Moreover, the ACHPR in the APDF judgment case should have brought into play the ACHPR and, more specifically, it should have engaged with the question of whether and, if yes, how the duties of individuals toward the community (Articles 27 and 29 ACHPR) could have a legal relevance to the interpretation of women's and children's rights.
Another example of the potentially problematic use of other, especially non-AU, international instruments and views of other bodies when interpreting the Charter is the ways in which the ACtHPR addresses peoples' rights under the ACHPR, since 'contrary to other human rights instruments, the ACHPR establishes the link between the right to life and the inviolable nature and integrity of the human being' , 218 and violations of economic, social and cultural rights may engender conditions unfavourable to a decent life. In the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights v Republic of Kenya case, the Ogiek people claimed that limited access to and removal from their ancestral home amounted to a violation of the community's right to decent survival, under Article 4 of the ACHPR. Even though the ACtHPR recognized the Ogiek as an indigenous population, and it held that the expulsion of the Ogiek from their ancestral lands against their will and without prior consultation violated their communal ownership rights under the right to property, it left unclear whether this violation was pronounced with regard to the individual members of the Ogiek or the Ogiek as a people. 219 In that judgment, the ACtHPR took cognizance of the practice of the ACmHPR, the views and General Comment of the ICESCR Committee and the case law of the IACtHR. This leaves one but to wonder to what extent the practice of these bodies is of sufficient relevance to the ACHPR's broader and more promising provisions, which are not to be found in other human rights treaties. 220 
(ii) Fragmenting African human rights law
Whereas the previous analysis addressed how the ACtHPR may raise legal concerns regarding its engagement with other human rights treaties, the present sub-Sections focuses on the alleged risk of undermining the Charter due to differing interpretations of the Charter by the ACtHPR and the ECCJ. This brings to the foreground the regional vis-à-vis the sub-regional levels of analysis.
In the absence of a catalogue of human rights in the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, the ECCJ decides human rights complaints by adopting the Charter as its standard of assessment. 221 It maintains that the Charter instantiates the ' African regional human rights framework' . 222 The ECCJ's interpretation, application and monitoring of the Charter is seen by some as leading to possibly diverging interpretations or conflicting judgments, and hence fragmentation of African human rights law. 223 Moreover, the ACtHPR and the ECCJ could, in theory, impose different obligations upon States which have accepted the ACtHPR's competence to receive individual complaints and are also ECOWAS Member States. 224 Finally, this could also mean that the same matter may be submitted consecutively before both courts. The ACHPR, however, does not have a provision precluding this scenario, and the Statute of the ECCJ prohibits only the concurrent submission of an application concerning the same matter before another international court. 225 It is striking how this discussion transplants the arguments and anxieties from the context of general bodies/global courts vis-à-vis regional/specialised courts into the context of regional vis-à-vis sub-regional courts on human rights. First, it is assumed that any tensions and different approaches in the case law of the ACtHPR and the ECCJ are negative, even though as previously discussed, such differences can be productive and meaningful and, in any event, not detrimental. Another recurring theme revolves around the protection of the integrity of the global and regional standards which are allegedly threatened by the regional/specialized and sub-regional courts, respectively. One cannot fail to notice the irony of scholars who argue that the inclusion of other (non-African treaties) into the jurisdiction of the ACtHPR undermines the specificity of African human rights law (as discussed in the previous sub-Section) and, at the same time, dismiss the opportunity to have two African courts enhancing the specificity of the regional bill of rights. The dominant perception in international law is that other bodies should not engage with, construe or monitor other treaties; and that the global or regional courts and standards are challenged or undermined by the regional and subregional courts and standards, respectively. 226 Our frame of reference should not be that a court holds a monopoly over its constitutive treaty. Neither the ACHPR nor the Protocol establishing the ACtHPR confer exclusive jurisdiction on the ACtHPR. 227 Our starting point should be, instead, that international courts have a 'shared ownership' over the regional bill of rights and pursue a common endeavour. 228 Crucially, there is nothing in the case law of the two courts to substantiate the concern about lowering the standards of the regional bill of rights. 229 On the contrary, they seem to share a vision of exercising a 'shared ownership' over the regional bill of rights which sets the minimum standard. The use and application of the Charter by the ECCJ strengthens the clarity of international law and deepens human rights protection. 230 In general, the overlap between the UN covenants and regional and sub-regional human rights law, and their respective monitoring bodies, enhances the influence of the UN covenants in the domestic sphere of African States and consolidates human rights standards. 231 The courts' systematic engagement with UN treaties, the references to and use of the practice of the HRC and the case law of other regional courts on human rights point toward this direction. 232 In addition to this, important and interesting issues (some of which have not found their way before the ACtHPR yet) are being litigated before the ECCJ, 233 since the EECJ enjoys a broad jurisdiction and grants direct access for individuals without a requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. 234 The subject matter of cases heard by the ECCJ spans across slavery; electoral systems and the right to political participation; independence of the judiciary; gender-based discrimination with regard to inheritance rules; reparation for terrorism victims; procedural aspects of the right to life; effective remedies; self-determination; and natural resources.
As long as the ECCJ gives due regard to the pronouncements of the ACtHPR and the ACmHPR, any tensions or differing interpretations shall be mitigated appropriately. This, of course, goes both ways-the ACtHPR also needs to take the ECCJ's judgments into account with regard to the ECCJ's pronouncements on both the Charter and other regional and sub-regional treaties and instruments on human rights which form the African corpus juris. The continental ACtHPR regularly applies and declares violations of regional treaties, such as the African Charter on Democracy, 235 and sub-regional treaties, including the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, 236 the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol 237 and the Maputo Protocol. 238 The absence of any discussion on why it is only a sub-regional but not a regional court on human rights that may undermine the African corpus juris reinforces the argument that unfounded, informal hierarchies among international courts are very well entrenched in the way we survey the legal horizon.
CONCLUSION
The ACtHPR's distinctive jurisdiction to interpret, apply and monitor not only the ACHPR but also other human rights treaties gives rise to a unique institutional design in judicial adjudication. It is expected that the subject matter of the complaints brought before the Court will further diversify in the future, and that the Court will have more opportunities to clarify the scope of its jurisdiction, as well as to nurture the specificities of the ACHPR and the African corpus juris.
The present author does not find it, in principle, problematic that the UN and other treaties may be justiciable and enforceable by a regional and specialized court on human rights, since the ACtHPR has specifically been endowed with the authority to do so. More generally, international courts should have as their frame of reference a vision of 'shared ownership' over international law. The analysis in this article has demonstrated that many international courts, including the ICJ, are gradually adopting this framework. The possibility of divergent interpretations of similar or identical rules of international law is largely overstressed in legal scholarship. Moreover, differences in courts' approaches also need to be appreciated as being productive and meaningful and, in any event, not that detrimental.
Although many of the concerns expressed by international law scholars regarding the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction are generally overemphasised, the Court's jurisdiction is not without issues to address. The analysis highlighted certain difficulties regarding the concept of 'human rights treaty' as a prerequisite for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction. The introduction of propriety considerations to the ACtHPR's jurisdiction is a work in progress in the Court's case law. It cannot be ruled out that the Court will adopt a judicial policy of self-restraint with regard to (not) examining specific complaints under other human rights treaties. Should the Court proceed with adopting such a judicial policy, it is strongly advisable that it clarifies concrete criteria and it does not reduce unduly the scope of its clear mandate. Finally, the development of the ACHPR's standards and the construction of a regional human rights corpus juris have nothing to fear from the wide jurisdiction of the ACtHPR. Finally, the development of the ACHPR's standards and the construction of a regional human rights corpus juris have nothing to fear from the wide jurisdiction of the ACtHPR as long as the Court is cautious as to the relevance and weight it attaches to other treaties, and the jurisprudence of other international courts and bodies when interpreting the Charter. A critical factor that will determine the Court's role, the development of a sustainable jurisprudence, compliance on behalf of the respondent States and a possible increase of the number of States accepting the Court's jurisdiction, is the quality of its judgments. 239 This includes the clarity of its reasoning and the comprehensiveness of the grounds of its decisions. The Court needs to address all points raised by the parties to a case in a satisfactory manner, and to properly deal with issues pertaining to its jurisdiction. 
